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Post Scriptum to Law Making in a Global World:
From Human Rights to a Law of Mankind
Olivier Morfteau*
The following thoughts, written shortly after one and a half
days of brainstorming on "Law Making in a Global World," are an
invitation to move one step further, featuring a utopia that could
become the topic of a forthcoming symposium.
A law of mankind? The very idea seems to contradict the
pluralistic perspective that emerges from the symposium,
especially from the presentations made by Roderick Macdonald
and Jacques Vanderlinden. It must be clear to the reader that the
author of this Post Scriptum fully endorses a pluralistic legal
approach based on the local experience of a community and, to
some extent, on the experience and aspirations of individuals, as
long as it does not deny or infringe on the public good, the spiritual
or philosophical values necessary for the survival of the group.
With very rare exceptions, no individual may survive and flourish
outside a community.
Several contributors to the symposium made it clear that the
local and the individual must not be neglected but promoted and
protected against a Western self-proclaimed global law. Here, in a
nutshell, are my views on Western ethnocentrism:
1. One must beware not to impose an exogenous Western
model to people who live under different customs and a different
view of what we call legal order. Let us first check with them to
determine whether they really need what may look essential to us.'
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1. In November 1999, at a one-week seminar sponsored by the United
Nations Development Program in the Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan (one of
the very few "third world" countries having escaped Western colonization), I
said, in an unpublished opening speech:
I would also like to express my deep admiration for the Bhutan and
Bhutanese and your tradition to solve disputes without resorting to the
courts and the law. You might have heard that there is a rather recent
movement, in Western countries, to promote informal justice, by way
of mediation and conciliation. We use the generic term of alternative
dispute resolution. We certainly have a lot to learn from you in this
respect and it would be very good to invite you in our countries for
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2. One should not be fooled into believing that the fact that
the most populated nation on earth adopts the Western model of
law making, a process brilliantly described by Volker Behr, means
the abandonment of a multi-millennial model of authoritarian
domination. The Chinese culture deeply rejects and despises the
Western model of justice. The present "Westernization" is a
makeshift screen; we should rather work at understanding the inner
rules of the emerging superpower and the traditions of its people.
I. NEW CHALLENGES
The idea of a law of mankind may be a global reaction to
globalization itself, to curb some of its most threatening effects. I
am not sure it may cure poverty, the huge problem pointed out by
Stathis Banakas, but it may help to not make things worse. It may
be a way of resurrecting a law of peoples, without denying what is
meant to remain particular and local. The individual and the local
would not be denied if the law of mankind was put in the hands of
the people rather than large scale supranational organizations.
The Romans already distinguished the jus civile (civil law)
from a jus gentium (a law of the peoples, based on principles
recognized by most nations). Grotius later developed the concept
of jus gentium as an idea of right order to which national states
should conform. Unfortunately, the concept of national
sovereignty became too strong, hindering the development of
international law, both in its public and private dimensions. Some
truly universal rules may develop today, under the supervision of
the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and other
agencies. Sometimes they twist the neck of national sovereignty,
and oftentimes they are curbed by it.
State sovereignty is portrayed as a cumbersome obstacle to the
free circulation of wealth, and tireless efforts are made to bypass it.
Meanwhile, it is still used as a powerful screen to restrict liability
and create immunities.
Not many areas of law managed to develop in a state-detached
perspective, ignoring or bypassing sovereignty, at least partly.
seminars on the subject. I do not know whether that could be covered
by the UNDP [never again did they invite my contribution] .... We
should not forget this tradition and it is our duty, we foreign experts, to
try to understand your culture and legal tradition. If we want to bring
you something and help, we may only be efficient if listening to you
and understanding your problems and existing solutions.
Olivier Mordteau, Remarks at the Seminar on Commercial Law (Nov. 1999) (on
file with author).
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International trade law is one, and human rights law another.
Historically, human rights have been protected by the courts, first
in England and the common law systems, including the United
States of America, and they have been proclaimed in a solemn
manner in countries where they happened to be endangered, like
France at the time of the French Revolution. The D&laration des
droits de l'homme et du citoyen (1789) served as a model for the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), made in the
context of the United Nations and for the European Convention on
Human Rights (1951). It shared a community of inspiration with
the U.S. Bill of Rights (1791), another product of the Age of
Enlightenment, an age of universalism promoting an intellectual
globalization.
The promotion of human rights strives to reconcile mankind
with its future after the darkest moments of its history in the
twentieth century. It is focused on the present, yet with unclear
boundaries as to the future, given the challenges of bioethics. The
legal community started giving part of the answer, which is largely
in the hands of the courts, whenever it had to solve cutting-edge
issues, such as those known under the names of wrongful birth,
assisted suicide, and reproductive cloning, to name but a few.
Human rights are expected to take care of challenges
addressing our identity as human beings, and in a sense, at least
morally, the future of our species is linked to the choices we make
or we accept.
The present globalization and development problems create
challenges of a planetary dimension. If the global demand for
cotton creates incentives to develop huge and ever-expanding
farms covering dozens of thousands of acres, threatening the rain-
forest of Amazonia, the problem is not purely national. True, this
may benefit Brazil, at least temporarily. Substantially reducing the
rainforest, however, has a planetary impact, which can be assessed
in terms of global warming and loss in biological diversity. We
know that this is causing a threat to the living conditions of the
generations to come, all over the world. Such problems are a new
challenge for the lawyers of the twenty-first century. Lawyers are
called to define the borderline of what is permitted or prohibited.
We lawyers are doing a much better job these days in terms of
protecting human rights (yet regrettably obliterating human duties
and obligations), but in what measure do we contribute to the
protection of the planet and the future of our species as a whole?
We have to think of the future of mankind in a comprehensive
or global way. Human rights must not be rejected but projected in
the vision of a future under threat, precisely because of the
freedom and activity of the human beings that we want to protect.
2007] 1225
6LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Human greed, appetite for power or domination, generates
prosperity when controlled by the law. The problem is that the
multiplicity of legal systems, each overprotective of national
sovereignty, no longer afford the necessary protection. Polluted
clouds ignore state borders, the future of all human beings is linked
to the protection of biodiversity, under threat in many different
parts of the world.
In this context, when it is, as we know, about five minutes to
midnight, may we remain content to see the most talented and
futuristic lawyers spend their energy on projects such as preparing
codes, consolidations, or restatements of the law for regional
associations of countries or "modernizing" the legal systems of
"emerging" countries? Sure, this is a legitimate and useful task in
a present-world perspective, but such efforts may look pathetic
from the point of view of future generations, where much more
urgent needs remain unattended.
II. NEW PERSPECTIVES
The challenge of our days is planetary. Our activity, geared to
the satisfaction of instant appetites or needs, jeopardizes the ability
of our planet to sustain the generations to come. Mankind as a
whole is today under threat. In this context, is it too much to
suggest that at least a handful of creative lawyers (to start with)
should try to work out solutions, looking at things in a radically
new perspective?
The purpose of this note is to start drawing what this
perspective may be. It is based on ideas that are in the air, but may
be too slow in reaching the busy lawyer's mind.
In a non-global context, the Western concept of individual
ownership may have been a way to favor small to large scale
economic development while protecting individual interests, as
limited as they may be. The Western concept of sovereignty may
have done the same, yet at the price of countless wars, today
largely eliminated from the Western world but exported to many
other places. Nowadays, resources to be owned are more limited
than before, and global warming cannot be solved at the level of
independent sovereign states. Private ownership and national
sovereignty have lost their paradigmatic value. This does not
mean that they are bound to disappear, but rather that new models
have to emerge.
In the nineteenth century already, James Lorimer suggested
that between the human being as an individual and mankind as a
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whole, there may be little room, if any, for sovereignty.2 Human
rights are at one end of the spectrum, and mankind is at the other
end. But who does think, in legal terms, about this other end?
This is the new perspective to be drawn.
Human rights focus on the rights of the individual, regardless
of race, sex, age, etc. The problems generated by the present
globalization call for another perspective, to be combined, of
course, with the individual-based human rights perspective. We
have to promote the other end of the spectrum and look at mankind
in general. Taking the double focus of the individual (human
rights) and mankind as a whole (rights of mankind), some of the
traditional concepts fabricated or shared by the lawyers,
philosophers, and politicians appear like obstacles rather than
facilitators.
Casting a universal outlook on the legal world is nothing new.
It was in the air at the dawn of comparative studies, when pioneers
like Lambert and Saleilles convened, in Paris, the first worldwide
congress of comparative law in 1900. The focus on mankind
brings an additional dimension. The word "mankind" carries with
it not only our present but our past and future experience as a
species presently dominating the world. The future is not the most
common perspective that we lawyers like to adopt. We rather
move backwards in our attempts to satisfy present needs, our eyes
being turned to the past and checking glimpses of the future in
little side mirrors. The present symposium gave ample evidence
that lawyers generally find it safer to have a conservative attitude.
A conservative attitude? All the better, since our concern here
is to preserve the chances for future generations to develop in a
livable world. Let us see what suitable conservative techniques the
lawyer's toolbox has to offer.
In an ever-changing world, where judges contribute at least as
much as legislators to the creation of the law, flexible standards
may be more effective than rigid rules. True, the rules are stable,
predictable, and may be adapted if needed. However, standards
are flexible by nature, easy to phrase, and understandable even by
non-lawyers. They adjust to new social, technical, and economical
contexts. They promote fair and homogeneous judgment favoring
diversity rather than grey minimal uniformity. 3
2. James Lorimer, 2 INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 131, 137 (1883)
(describing human beings as citizens of the world).
3. Olivier Mor~teau, Le Standard et la Diversitg, in LAW AND HUMAN
DIVERSITY 71-90 (Mauro Bussani & Michele Graziadei eds., 2005).
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III. BACK TO STANDARDS
I see at least two traditional standards that may become the
pillars of a law of mankind. One is inherited from the civil law,
the other from the common law. And both may be compatible
with non-Western cultures, a point to be investigated with the most
open and humble attitude.
The first one is the antiquated bonus pater familias (good
family father), inherited from Roman law and phrased or rephrased
in various languages in a multitude of civil codes. It may sound
shockingly sexist, unless we substitute "parent" for "father."
Traditionally, it is applied wherever someone is entrusted with the
property of another. Such property is to be managed and used in
such a way as not to prevent its transmission to and use by future
generations. A bold move here may be the imposition of a duty,
not only to those who possess for the benefit of others, but to
owners themselves. To every right, there is a corresponding duty.
After all, even when we own, do we not have a duty to mankind to
ensure that what is not renewable will not be disposed of in a final
way?
Can we imagine a more fertile standard for protecting
nonrenewable resources and the fragile equilibrium of our
environment? The standard points to the relative character of
individual ownership: The law gives the owner extended
prerogatives but may request the owner to comply with at least
limited duties, owed not to anyone in particular (though this should
not be excluded, wherever appropriate) but to generations to come.
Thomas Jefferson wrote, in a letter to James Madison, "that the
earth belongs in usufruct to the living."4 What we believe we own,
we actually borrow from future generations or hold as trustees for
society at large.
5
For many reasons, since the Latin language has no generic
word to define parents, one may substitute the feminine mater
familias. Mothers do a better job in terms of preservation, which
makes the adjective "good" redundant. The reference to family is
to be maintained, creating a nexus. A duty must be owed to
someone. Mankind is our extended family, and after all, again to
4. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789),
reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (H.A. Washington ed.,
1861), available at http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/jefferson/earthbelong.html.
5. This echoes the concept of trusteeship as elaborated by Gandhi, who
studied jurisprudence and read Snell's Principles of Equity (still a major source
book on equity in English law). See V.T. Patil & I.A. Lokapur, Gandhi's
Concept of Trusteeship: An Analysis, in STUDIES ON GANDHI 99 (V.T. Patil ed.,
1983).
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justify the feminine, do we not refer to Gaia as Mother Earth? We
honor our parents or ancestry in taking care of our offspring: this
may reconcile the Western world with non-Western traditions.
IV. ABUSE OF RIGHT AND REASONABLENESS
Abuse of right may be introduced as a companion concept, a
central one in a law of mankind. This is a widespread rule,
developed in countless jurisdictions, preventing owners from
exerting their otherwise legitimate right in a way that brings them
no profit but the mischievous satisfaction of causing harm to their
neighbors.6 It may be extended to prevent any abuse of a right that
would harm future generations, such as accumulating dangerous
substances that may pollute water or cause harmful contamination
in the years or decades to come.
Abuse of right also connects to a second standard. The
standard of the reasonable man, today the reasonable person,
serves to define duties owed to persons to whom we are not
connected by contract or agreement. It was magnificently stated in
1932 by a famous English judge, Lord Atkin, in the celebrated
Donoghue v. Stevenson case:
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in
law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's
question, Who is my neighbour, receives a restricted reply.
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions
which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure
your neighbour. Who then in law is my neighbour? The
answer seems to be-persons who are so closely and
directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have
them in contemplation as being so affected when I am
directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called
in question.
William Twining once pointed to the usefulness of this
standard in a global context.8 This is indeed a very powerful one,
6. For a recent view showing that this doctrine, born in the context of civil
law jurisdictions, is not unknown in the common law, see Elspeth Reid, The
Doctrine of Abuse of Rights: Perspective from a Mixed Jurisdiction,
ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Oct. 2004), available at
http://www.ejcl.org/. See also P. Catala & T. Weir, Delict and Torts: A Study in
Parallel, Part 1, 38 TUL. L. REv. 221, 237 (1964).
7. [1932] A.C. 562, at 580 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.) (U.K.).
8. William Twining & David Miers, How To Do THINGS WITH RULES: A
PRIMER OF INTERPRETATION 54-55 (3d ed. 1991).
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enabling one to assess the extent of liability in a typical
neighboring context (e.g., when I live at some upper floor in a
multi-story building, I must reasonably anticipate that if I leave my
bathtub unattended with faucets fully open, an inundation may
occur, likely to cause harm to the residents below), as well as in an
international pollution case (e.g., if my company allows some toxic
substance to spill into the river, I may reasonably anticipate that it
may contaminate the water and cause damage to cultures and
fisheries downstream, some of which may be located beyond a
state border).
In the law of mankind, ownership and liability may not be
without limits. However, these limits should not be affected by
borders of so-called sovereign entities. They are based on
reasonable anticipation. True, judges are not experts to be expected
to assess in every given case to what extent conduct or omission
may affect the welfare of future generations. They have to rely on
scientific evidence. In case of doubt as to the existence of
irreversible harm, they must apply the precautionary principle.
A lot would already be achieved if polluters, developers, and
other predators were to pay in situations where the danger is
obvious. Such situations are innumerous today, and we become
increasingly aware of the toll we are imposing on future generations.
The law of mankind reminds us that to every single right, there
is a corresponding duty, a perspective also worth remembering in
the context of human rights.
V. BACK TO CITIZENS
Another big tool of the law of mankind, this time a procedural
one, is the development of class actions, allowing individual citizens
to pool their claims and operate as a powerful lever, in situations
where politicians do not dare to act. Once big transnational class
actions emerge, a heavy pressure will be applied to the presently
untouchable multinational companies, especially if courts do apply
the above-mentioned standards. This may be even more effective
than the creation of a new international body to protect the
environment, as advocated by President Chirac of France.9 The two
may actually combine. The law of mankind may develop top down
9. His speech of February 2, 2007, coincided with the meeting in Paris of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which produced an
authoritative report on global warming, concluding that it is unequivocal and
very likely caused by human activity, and will continue for centuries. See
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, http://www.ipcc.ch/ (last visited
May 21, 2007).
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and bottom up, but it is safer to put it in the hands of the citizens and
the judge, to prevent the blocking effect of the antiquated and
devastating concept of sovereignty and the denial of local
perspectives. Universality must be reconciled with diversity.
Let us get used to these new perspectives and draw them more
precisely. Is this unrealistic? The law, like the world, needs a zest
of utopia to move on. The problems are real, and it takes vision to
face them in a realistic manner. Human rights are to be completed
by a law of mankind. It must be the duty of future-oriented and
open-minded lawyers and thinkers of all nations to map this new
dimension of the law and to work at making it effective.

